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A REAPPRAISAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF MISCEGENATION STATUTES*
Andrew D. Weinberger'
Today, twenty-five States of the Union by statute forbid marriages
on racial grounds.' These statutes are neither uniform in the racial
groups against whom the ban is applicable, nor in defining membership
in the various ethnic groups. Thus, while in Idaho white-Mongolian
marriages are illegal and void,2 in North Carolina they are permitted.3
In Arkansas, where white-Negro marriages are void, a Negro is defined
as "any person who has in his or her veins any Negro blood whatever. '
In Florida, one ceases to be a Negro when he has less than "one-eighth
of... African or Negro blood"; 8 and in Oklahoma, anyone not of "Afri-
can descent" is miraculously transmuted into a member of the white
race.
6
The racial groups' affected by such statutes include Mongolians,8
* The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance of Don J. Hager, Ph.D.,
Professor of Anthropology, Princeton (1948-1953) and that of Marvin T. Hyman, Esq.,
of the New York Bar.
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 223, for biographical data.
I Ala. Code tit. 14, § 360 (1940); Ariz. Code Ann. § 63-107 (1939), as amended
(1942); Ark. Stat. § 55-104 (1947); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 90, § 1-2 (1953); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 13, § 101 (1953); Fla. Const., art. XVI, § 24; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.11
(1944); Ga. Code § 53-106 (1933); Idaho Code Ann. § 32-206 (1948); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 44-
104 (Burns, 1952); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 402.020 (1953); La. Civ. Code art. 94 (Dart 1945);
Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 466 (1951); Miss. Const., art. 14, § 263; Miss. Code Ann. § 459
(1942); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.020 (1949); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-103 (1943); Nev. Comp.
Laws § 10197 (1929); N.C. Const., art. XIV, § 8; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-3 (1950);
Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 12 (1951) ; S.C. Const., art. 3, § 34; S.C. Code § 20-7 (1952) ; Tenn.
Const., art. 11, § 14; Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-402 (1956); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4607
(1948); Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-2 (1953); Va. Code Ann. § 20-54 (1950); W. Va. Code
Ann. § 4701(1) (1955); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 50-108 (1945).
This contrasts with seventeen States having statutes requiring segregation in educa-
tion. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955). See
also Comments, 32 Calif. L. Rev. 269 (1944); 20 So. Calif. L. Rev. 80 (1946).
There is no federal policy against intermarriage. None of the territories or possessions
has such statutes. Apparently Guam at one time had such prohibitions, but these were
abolished in 1951. (Public Law 19, First Guam Legislature.)
Those States which at one time had anti-miscegenation statutes, together with the date of
repeal, are: Iowa, .1851; Kansas, 1857; Maine, 1883; Massachusetts, 1840; Michigan,
1883; Montana, 1953; New Mexico, 1866; North Dakota, 1955; Ohio, 1877; Oregon, 1951;
Rhode Island, 1881; South Dakota, 1957; Washington, 1867.
2 Idaho Code Ann. § 32-206 (1948).
3 North Carolina Constitution, N.C. Gen. Stat. supra note 1.
4 Ark. Stat. § 41-808 (1947).
5 Fla. Stat. § 1.01 (1953).
6 The Oklahoma Constitution, art. XXIII, § 11 provides:
Wherever in this Constitution and laws of this State the word or words "colored"
or "colored race," "Negro" or "Negro race" are used, the same shall be construed
to mean or apply to all persons of African descent. The term "white race" shall
include all other persons.
7 Ethnic groups would be a more correct description as these are not each a separate
race.
8 Idaho, Nevada, Utah and Wyoming.
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Malays,9 Hindus,10 Chinese,1 Japanese, 2 Ethiopians," American In-
dians,' 4 Cherokees,' 5 Mestizos,"0 Halfbreeds,"' and "the brown race."-'
The sole racial group (other than white persons) affected by all twenty-
five statutes is the Negro.' 9
The courts of last resort of twelve States 0 have upheld anti-mis-
cegenation statutes and the statutes of the other thirteen States have been
enforced in the lower courts. In only one State, California, has a legis-
lative prohibition of marriage between the races been declared un-
constitutional.2 '
The United States Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction in a case from
Virginia which squarely raised the question whether a statute proscrib-
ing the marriage of the Chinese appellant to a Caucasian woman was
violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court decided the record was incomplete as to the domicile of the
parties and remanded it to the Virginia Supreme Court to be returned
to the trial court so that additional evidence could be taken.2
9 Arizona, California, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, Utah and Wyoming.
10 Arizona.
11 Nebraska.
12 Nebraska.
13 Nevada.
14 North Carolina and South Carolina.
15 North Carolina.
16 South Carolina.
17 South Carolina.
18 Nevada.
19 There was no such prohibition at common law. 1 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce, and
Separation 308 (1873); Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations 35 (1931).
Early in the development of the colonies severe penalties were enacted for sexual inter-
course between members of different racial groups. As early as 1661, Maryland provided
by statute that English women having children fathered by Negro slaves were to be
slaves of the Negro's master. By 1717, the colony's laws provided that where a child
resulted from a miscegenistic connection, the white parent was to be placed in servitude
for seven years; the Negro, if free, was to be slaved for life; and the child was to be
placed in servitude for thirty-one years. In Virginia, the white parent was banished
from the colony, and in North Carolina, along with the child, was placed in servitude.
Reuter, Race Mixture 78 (1931).
20. Green v. Alabama, 58 Ala. 190 (1877); State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P.2d 882
(1942); Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 31 S.W. 977 (1895); Jackson v. Denver, 109
Colo. 196, 124 P.2d 240 (1942); Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321 (1869); State v. Gibson,
36 Ind. 389 (1871); Miller v. Lucks, 203 Miss. 824, 36 So. 2d 140 (1948); State v.
Jackson, 80 Mo. 175 (1883); State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251 (1877); Eggers v. Olson,
104 Okla. 297, 231 Pac. 483 (1924); Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287 (1871); Naim v.
Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749, remanded, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), aff'd, 197 Va. 734,
90 S.E.2d 849, app. dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
21 Perez v. Sharpe, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948). The California Supreme Court, by
a four to three decision, sitting as a court of the first instance (at that time actions against
a public official were initiated in the Supreme Court) granted mandamus against a
County Clerk who refused to issue a marriage license to petitioners, one of whom was
Negro and the other white, holding the statute violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The statute has not been repealed but the decision, not the statute, is observed as the law.
For a discussion of this case see Notes, 1 Stan. L. Rev. 289 (1949); 58 Yale LJ. 472
(1949).
22 Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955). The opinion per curiam reads:
The inadequacy of the record as to the relationship of the parties to the Common-
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Thereupon, that court, presumptuously, held that the record clearly
showed that the plaintiff was a resident of Virginia; the defendant a
non-resident, and that both parties had been married in North Carolina
for the purpose of circumventing the Virginia anti-miscegenation statute.
Therefore, the court concluded, the case was decided upon a complete
record and there was no procedure to remand the case to the trial court
to take further evidence and, in complete contravention of the Supreme
Court's determination, affirmed its own decision.23 Nevertheless, upon
application to the Supreme Court to recall the remand or to argue de
novo, the Court held that the second judgment of the Virginia court left
the case devoid of a properly presented federal question and denied the
application.24
Of all discriminations practiced against Negroes, Mexicans, Indians,
and other ethnic minorities, the prohibition against intermarriage is the
one which the minority groups are least interested in abolishing. Myrdal
lists a "White Man's Rank Order of Discriminations ' 25 as an organizing
principle in his study. His order of importance of types of discrimina-
tion, that is, the order in which white believers in segregation object
to integration, is:
1. Intermarriage.
2. Barriers against dancing, bathing, eating and social intercourse
generally.
3. Segregation in schools, churches and transportation.
4. Political disenfranchisement.
5. Discrimination in law courts, by the police and other public
servants.
6. Discrimination in housing, employment, credit and public relief.
The non-Caucasian's rank order of objectionable attitudes is parallel
but precisely inverse to that of the white segregationist.2 6
The tremendous struggle of recent years in and out of the courts for
racial equality has been to abolish discrimination and segregation in
employment, housing, education, voting and the use of public facilities.
In the mass of litigation, publications and addresses sponsored by the
wealth of Virginia at the time of the marriage in North Carolina and upon their
return to Virginia, and the failure of the parties to bring here all questions relevant
to the disposition of the case, prevents the constitutional issue of the validity of the
Virginia statute on miscegenation tendered here being considered "in clean cut and
concrete form, unclouded" by such problems. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court,
331 U.S. 549, 584. The judgment is vacated and the case remanded to the Supreme
Court of Appeals in order that the case may be returned to the Circuit Court of
the City of Portsmouth for action not inconsistent with this opinion.
23 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956).
24 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
25 Myrdal, An American Dilemma 60 (1944).
26 Id. at 60, 61.
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National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, there has
been no effort whatever favoring intermarriage. As a prominent Negro
writer said:
One barrier to a closer drawing together of the white and Negro races
in America has been the misconception on the part of many whites that
the Negro desires amalgamation ...
Speaking as a Negro, I know that most Negroes do not desire sexual re-
lationships with white women. . . . Negro men resent the mingling of
white men and Negro women as much as white men fear miscegenation
of white women and Negro men.27
Yet the ethnic minorities understandably find statutes repugnant which
classify them as inferior and unfit to marry persons they may choose. 8
As DuBois said:
But the impudent and vicious demand that all colored folk shall write
themselves down as brutes by a general assertion of their unfitness to
marry other decent folk, is a nightmare 29
Substantial injury to more tangible interests is, moreover, often a
factor to be weighed. In addition to the prohibition of marriage, criminal
penalties are often prescribed," and by statute the offspring of such
marriages are declared illegitimate.3 Other social situations32 such as
violation of the vagrancy statutes,33 the marital privilege available to a
defendant in a criminal prosecution,34 and the right to receive property
bequeathed by will,35 or passing under the laws of intestacy, 3 are there-
by affected.
Despite the differences in holdings between the States, in 1954 the
27 Logan, A Negro's Faith in America 27 (1946).
28 Myrdal, op. cit. supra note 25 at 64, 65; DuBois, Crisis 106 (Editorial 1920).
29 DuBois, ibid.
30 Ala. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 360 (1940) (felony); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 90, § 1-3
(1953) (misdemeanor); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 102 (1953) (misdemeanor); Fla. Stat.
§ 741.12 (1953) (felony); Ga. Code Ann. § 53-106 (1933) (felony); Ind. Ann. Stat.
§ 10-4222 (Burns 1952) (felony); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 402-990 (1955) (felony); La.
Crim. Code art. 740-79 (Dart 1943) (felony); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 513 (1951)
(felony); Miss. Code Ann. § 2339 (1942) (felony); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.020 (1949)
(misdemeanor); Nev. Comp. Laws, § 10198 (1929) (misdemeanor); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14-181 (1952) (misdemeanor) ; Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 13 (1951) (felony) ; S.C. Code § 20-7
(1952) (misdemeanor); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-403 (1956) (felony); Tex. Pen. Code
Ann. art. 492 (1952) (felony); Va. Code Ann. § 20-59 (1950) (felony); W. Va. Code
Ann. § 4697 (1955) (misdemeanor); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 50-109 (1945) (mis-
demeanor).
31 E.g., Florida Statute, supra note 1.
32 See Comments, 32 Calif. L. Rev. 269 (1944); 20 So. Calif. L. Rev. 80 (1946).
33 Jackson v. Denver, supra note 20. The defense to a charge of vagrancy (which
included meretricious cohabitation) was marriage. The court held that the marriage
was void because of the racial differences of the spouses and, therefore, the defense
was untenable.
34 State v. Pass, supra note 20.
35 Miller v. Lucks, supra note 20.
36 Eggers v. Olson, supra note 20.
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United States Supreme Court refused certiorari in a case in which the
constitutionality of the Alabama statute was directly raised.37 However,
a year later the Court accepted jurisdiction in the Naim case, and though
it was thwarted from making a constitutional determination by pro-
cedural defects, it is reasonable to believe that at the next opportunity
the Court will pass on this question.
It is accordingly timely to reappraise the constitutionality of the mis-
cegenation statutes and their concept of a "mongrel breed of citizens.13 1
RACIAL CLASSIFICATION AND THE RIGHT TO MARRY
The right to marry is a civil right and it is, therefore, within the
purview of the equal protection clause. In Meyer v. Nebraska,39 the
Court said:
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty
thus guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], the term has received
much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely
stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint but also the right of the individual to ... marry, establish a home
and bring up children ...
Judge Traynor in the Perez case described the nature of the right to
marry and the constitutional protection afforded it in even more eloquent
terms.
Marriage... is something more than a civil contract subject to regulation
by the state; it is a fundamental right of free men. There can be no pro-
hibition of marriage except for an important social objective and by
reasonable means....
Legislation infringing such rights must be based upon more than
prejudice and must be free from oppressive discrimination to comply with
the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection of
the laws.40
To this concept of marriage as a civil right there should then be ap-
plied the prohibitions, as previously defined by the Court, against classi-
fication by race. Consider first Strauder v. West Virginia4 in which
the Court said:
• ..all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the
laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection
the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be
made against them by laws because of their color....42
37 Jackson v. State, 37 Ala. App. 519, 72 So. 2d 114, cert. denied sub nom., Jackson
v. Alabama, 348 U.S. 888 (1954).
38 Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 90, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (1955). For a critical discussion
of this case see 1 Howard L. Rev. 84 (1955).
39 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). See also, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
40 Perez v. Sharpe, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 714-15, 198 P.2d 17, 18-19 (1948).
41 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
42 Id. at 307.
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In Edwards v. California,43 Mr. Justice Jackson said that race was
"constitutionally an irrelevance."44 And while the doctrine of "separate
but equal" is no longer accepted, Plessy v. Ferguso 4 5 is still authority
for the proposition that "the object of the [Fourteenth] Amendment was
undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before
the law.")4
Consistently in area after area the Court has held that race may
not be a means of legislative classification.
A Louisville, Kentucky, ordinance which established white and colored
residential zones was tested against the equal protection clause in 1917
and held void. Racial restrictive land covenants were held judicially
unenforceable in 1948.48 In Brown v. Board of Education,49 the Court
required that public schools be desegregated, holding that separation
itself was a denial of equality.
The Court has held that the States are prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment from using race as a test in licensing laundries50 and com-
mercial fishermen.5
The only exception to this long line of decisions, one after another
denouncing racial classification in legislation, is the military restrictions
imposed on persons of Japanese descent during World War 11.52 Hira-
bayashi v. United States and Korematsu v. United States were justified
by the Court as war measures taken by the Federal Government. But
they were criticized by leading scholars immediately after the decisions
were published and the Court subsequently retreated from its position.5 3
Furthermore, they are no authority for racial grouping by the States.5 4
The basis for the State courts' finding of constitutionality rests pri-
marily upon two arguments:
A. The statutes are not discriminatory as they apply equally to all
races; and
43 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
44 Id. at 185.
45 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
46 Id. at 544.
47 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
48 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
49 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
50 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
51 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
52 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943).
53 Dembetz, "Racial Discrimination and the Military judgment," 45 Colum. L. Rev.
175 (1945); Rostow, "The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster," 54 Yale L.J. 489
(1945). See also Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
54 However, this uniformity of protection has not been extended to aliens. Clarke v.
Deckenbach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Patsone v.
Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914). See also, Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in
American Law (1946).
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B. The racial classifications made in the statutes are reasonable in
view of the legislative objective and, therefore, do not violate the due
process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 55
EQUAL APPLICATION OF MISCEGENATION STATUTES
Pace v. Alabama5" is often cited as holding that the miscegenation
statutes place an equal inhibition upon both white and non-white per-
sons, and therefore are constitutional. 7 This is strained reasoning since
Pace was an appeal from a conviction for violation of an Alabama
statute providing penalties for fornication and adultery where one party
to the crime was white and the other Negro. In challenging the constitu-
tionality of this statute, it was argued that a similar statute provided
lesser penalties where both parties were white or both were Negro. The
statute considered was tested by the Court, however, against the penal-
ties in the statute itself, and those penalties were found to be equal for
both the white and the non-Caucasian person involved.
Indeed, the offense against which this latter section is aimed cannot be
committed without involving the persons of both races in the same punish-
ment. Whatever discrimination is made in the punishment prescribed in
the two sections is directed against the offense designated and not against
the person of any particular color or race. The punishment of each of-
fending person, whether white or black, is the same.58
In considering the effect of this case, it should not be overlooked that
penal prohibition of illicit intercourse can hardly be equated with a
similar prohibition of a sanctified relationship. The Pace decision is far
from a constitutional approval of a prohibition of interracial marriage.59
While there is apparent equal treatment of the different races and
ethnic groups in the statutes on miscegenation, it is self-evident even if
55 A third argument sometimes advanced is that segregation promotes public peace
by preventing race conflicts which would arise upon desegregation. The Supreme Court
in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917) stated that "important as is the preserva-
tion of the public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances which
deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution." judge Traynor is even
more forceful in rejecting this contention. "It is no answer to say that race tension
can be eradicated through the perpetuation by law of the prejudices which give rise
to the tension." Perez v. Sharpe, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 725, 198 P.2d 17, 25 (1948).
56 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
57 Thurgood Marshall, The Supreme Court as Protector of Civil Rights: Equal Pro-
tection of the Laws, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 101 (May 1951):
Pace v. Alabama . . . upheld the constitutionality of a legislative proscription of
intermarriage between Negroes and white persons.
It should not be overlooked, however, that this was written in 1951 before Brown v.
Board of Education, supra note 1.
58 106 U.S. at 585.
59 In Moore v. Missouri, 159 US. 673, 678 (1895), the Court, citing the Pace case, said:
The general doctrine [is] that the [Fourteenth] Amendment in respect of the ad-
ministration of criminal justice, requires that no different degree or higher punishment
shall be imposed on one than is imposed on all for like offense ....
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the doctrine of "separate but equal" were still valid, that it cannot apply
in the marital relationship. How can it be said that when two persons
are denied the right to marry because of race, they may find equal
opportunity within their own groups? In Perez, decided before Brown
and the 1956 decision in Gayle v. Browder,60 the difference in the viola-
tion of constitutional rights in prohibitions of marriage and the denial
of other less personal rights, was already indicated.
A holding that ... segregation does not impair the right of an individual
to ride on trains or to enjoy a legal education is clearly inapplicable to
the right of an individual to marry. Since the essence of the right to
marry is freedom to join in marriage with the person of one's choice, a
segregation statute for marriage necessarily impairs the right to marry.6'
While the decision in the Brown case has changed the "holding" as to
public education and Gayle v. Browder as to transportation, the latter
part of the statement remains as true today as it was in 1948. The
"separate but equal" theory, so recently rejected with regard to public
education and transportation, has never logically had any place in the
discussion of interracial marriage.
The choice of a spouse is a subjective act, the act of individuals and
not races. It would therefore follow that a classification by statute of
those prohibited from marrying each other must be made on an in-
dividual basis and not on a group basis.62
SUPPOSED EFFECTS OF INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE UPON SOCIETY-
A VALID LEGISLATIVE OBJECT?
Statutes prohibiting marriage on grounds other than racial ones have
a place in society. Prohibition of marriages of feebleminded persons or
60 352 U.S. 903 (1956), affirming 142 F. Supp. 707 (D.C. Ala. 1956).
61 Perez v. Sharpe, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 717, 198 P.2d 17, 21 (1948).
62 "The petitioner's right was a personal one. It was as an individual that he was
entitled to the equal protection of the laws. .. ." Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938); see also, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Even though discriminatory statutes generally affect the minority races more than
Caucasians, the anti-miscegenation statutes are more discriminating towards Caucasians.
Thus the Virginia statute on miscegenation, supra note 1, reads in part:
It shall hereafter be unlawful for any white person in this State to marry any save
a white person, or a person with no other admixture of blood than white and
American Indian.
There is no other prohibition based on race in the Virginia statute. It follows that while
a white person must seek a spouse only among Caucasians, the members of all other ethnic
groups may freely marry anyone other than a white person within the borders of all
the groups. See also State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P.2d 882 (1942). In this case, the
interesting proposition was raised that since the Arizona statute provided "the marriage
of persons of Caucasian blood or their descendants, with Negroes, Mongolians, members
of the Malay race, or Hindus or their descendants shall be null and void," persons of mixed
ancestry could not marry anyone. The question was not resolved as the record did not
indicate whether the parties were of mixed genes. The Arizona legislature subsequently
removed the words "or their descendants" from the statute. This same confusion is found
in the Texas statute, and was pointed to in the Perez case, 32 Cal. 2d at 721, 198 P.2d a~t
23.
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of persons with communicable diseases are not uncommon. Each of
these is supported by demonstrable scientific knowledge63 that such
marriages present a potential danger to society through physically or
mentally ill offspring. In these statutes, the requirements of a reason-
able legislative objective and a reasonable connection between the legis-
lation and the ends sought have been met.64
In support of the statutes prohibiting interracial marriage, much the
same argument is offered. Could it be demonstrated that biologically
inferior children would be the result of such marriages, the necessity
of a reasonable legislative objective would be met. While some courts
have attempted a reasonable analysis, ordinarily they simply repeat out-
moded and unscientific genetical conclusions. Thus a Georgia court
said:
The amalgamation of the races is not only unnatural, but it is always pro-
ductive of deplorable results. Our daily observation shows us that the
offspring of these unnatural connections are generally sickly and effeminate,
and that they are inferior in physical development and strength, to the
full blood of either race.65
The Virginia Supreme Court in the Naim case found the legislative
object to be "to preserve the racial integrity of ... [the state's] citizens
* . . [and] to regulate the marriage relation so that it will not have a
mongrel breed of citizens."66
No authorities or sources whatever were cited for the opinions on
race and heredity in that case. And the dissenting opinion in the Cali-
63 In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), the Court had before it a
statute providing for compulsory vaccination of all adults residing in a smallpox epidemic
area. Jacobson refused to be vaccinated, contending that this was not a proper exercise
of the police power. Holding that the police power extends to matters of health, the
Court found that "for nearly a century most of the members of the medical profession
have regarded vaccination, repeated after intervals, as a Oreventive of smallpox." (197
U.S. at 23) The Court concluded that there was a reasonable connection between
the statute and the end sought.
In substantiating its conclusion as to the effect of vaccination, the Court in a copious
footnote, beginning at page 32 of the opinion, set forth all of the available scientific
evidence supporting the efficacy of vaccination.
For an excellent discussion of the use of social science at the trial level see, Greenberg,
"Social Scientists Take the Stand," 54 Mich. L. Rev. 7 (1956).
64 Quaker City Cab v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 400 (1928); Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200 (1927); Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 201 (1912).
65 Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869). That opinions such as this are not ex-
clusively held by the white race is evidenced by this quotation from Scarborough, On the
Trail of Negro Folk-Songs 20 (1925):
I learned of a quarrel Uncle Israel had with one of the mulatto house servants
about this question of color. She had disrespectfully called him a Nigger and he had
retorted:
"What if I is a Nigger? I b'longs to a race of people. But you ain't. I didn't never
read in de Bible about whar it speaks of mulattoes as a race of people. You is
mules, dat's what you is."
... He said to me, "De mulattoes ain't live as long as white folks or colored either.
Dey ain't healthy folks. I'll tell that to deir face."
66 Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 89, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (1955).
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fornia Supreme Court in 1948 in the Perez case is of the same school
of thinking, that is, it completely disregards the twentieth-century de-
velopments in the science of human genetics. The rationale of the
state courts is abhorrent to American science and jurisprudence. They
adhere to and perpetuate three erroneous assumptions: (1) that "pure
races" either exist in the present or have existed in the past; (2) that
crossing between different racial groups results in biologically inferior
offspring; (3) that cultural level is dependent upon racial attributes.
Contemporary physical anthropology and human genetics disprove these
three assumptions.
(1) The Idea of "Pure Races"
To speak of race "mixtures" or "mongrelization" is to imply that
"pure races" either still exist or have existed in the past. Contemporary
biological research and theory refute both of these implications. The
idea of "pure" racial groups, either past or present, has long been aban-
doned by modern biological and social science. To the contrary:
Race mixture has been going on during the whole of recorded history.
Incontrovertible evidence from studies on fossil human remains shows that
even in pre-history, at the very dawn of humanity, mixing of different
stocks, at least occasionally, took place.67
The scientific position concerning the idea of "pure races" is contained
in this statement by a distinguished American geneticist:
The idea of a pure race is not even a legitimate abstraction; it is a subter-
fuge used to cloak one's ignorance of the phenomenon of racial variation. 68
The idea of "pure races" is refuted by paleontological and genetical
studies of human evolution. All mankind is a member of a single species,
Homo sapiens. All known physical variations among men, therefore,
continue to take place within species boundaries, not without. When
considering human evolution and modern "races," we are not dealing
with separate species. Interbreeding among human groups manifesting
differences in physical attributes produces live, fertile offspring-the
mark of membership in a single species. It has been established empiri-
cally that the offspring of mixed marriages are no less physically and
67 Dunn and Dobzhansky, Heredity, Race and Society 115 (1952).
18 Dobzhansky, "The Race Concept in Biology," The Scientific Monthly 161-65
(February, 1941). For additional corroborating evidence rejecting the idea of "pure
races," see Boyd, Genetics and the Races of Man: An Introduction to Modem Physical
Anthropology 184-209 (1950); Dobzhansky, Genetic Differences Among Men, Evolu-
tionary Thought in America 86-155 (1950); Kluckhohn, Mirror for Man 102-44 (1949);
Ashley Montague, A Consideration of the Concept of Race 15, Origin and Evolution of
Man, Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative Biology 315-36 (1950); Ashley Mon-
tagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race 100-33 (1945).
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psychologically sound than those where both parents are of the same
race.
69
Under the sponsorship of the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), twelve scientists representing
physical anthropology and human genetics met in June 1951 to consider
the preparation of a statement which would effect a crystallization of
scientific theory and opinion on matters of race and race differences.
The Statement on the Nature of Race and Race Differences was re-
leased by UNESCO in September of 1952.10
The Statement at Article 7 said concerning "pure races":
There is no evidence for the existence of so-called "pure" races. Skeletal
remains provide the basis of our limited knowledge about earlier races.
In regard to race mixture, the evidence points to the fact that human
hybridization has been going on for an indefinite but considerable time.
Indeed, one of the processes of race formation and race extinction or ab-
sorption is by means of hybridization between races. As there is no
reliable evidence that disadvantageous effects are produced thereby, no
biological Justification exists for prohibiting intermarriage between per-
sons of different races. (Emphasis added.)
69 Reuter, The Mulatto in the United States 117 et seq. (1918). That popular
opinion is to the contrary is shown by an Associated Press dispatch from Bastrop, La.,
dated November 2, 1955, which read in part:
The Morehouse Parish School Board has voted unanimously to discontinue use of
a ninth-grade general science textbook which some persons say "contains un-American
ideas on the origin of races."
Superintendent of Schools Luckey told the board the book could be set aside if
the school board objected to it. He said the title was "Science for Better Living."
This passage was among those cited as objectionable:
"Living things which belong to recognizable kinds, which are like in most physical
traits, and which breed freely with each other, are said to belong to one species.
All men on this earth belong to one species-homo sapiens."
Persons who object to the book said this was a plain insinuation that races "breed
freely with each other" and is a dangerous Socialistic trend of thought to instill
into the younger generation.
10 UNESCO has distributed the Statement in a variety of publications. It is one of
several publications in the series, The Race Question in Modern Science. The 1952 State-
ment was drafted at Unesco House, Paris, on June 8, 1951, by Professor R. A. M.
Bergman, Royal Tropical Institute, Netherlands Anthropological Society, Amsterdam;
Professor Gunnar Dahlberg, Director, State Institute for Human Genetics and Race
Biology, University of Upsala; Professor L. C. Dunn, Department of Zoology, Columbia
University; Professor J. B. S. Haldane, Head, Department of Biometry, University Col-
lege, London; Professor M. F. Ashley Montagu, Chairman, Department of Anthropology,
Rutgers University; Dr. A. E. Mourant, Director, Blood Group Reference Laboratory,
Lister Institute, London; Professor Hans Nachtsheim, Director, Institut for Genetik,
Freie Universitat, Berlin; Dr. Eugene Schreider, directeur adjoint du laboratoire d'anthro-
pologie physique de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes, Paris; Professor Harry L. Shapiro, Chair-
man, Department of Anthropology, American Museum of Natural History, New York; Dr.
J. C. Trevor, Faculty of Archeology and Anthropology, University of Cambridge; Dr.
Henri V. Vallois, professeur au Museum d'histoire naturelle, directeur du Musee de
1'Homme, Paris; Professor S. Zuckerman, Head, Department of Anatomy, Medical School,
University of Birmingham, Eng.; Professor Th. Dobzhansky, Department of Zoology,
Columbia University; Dr. Julian Huxley contributed to the final wording. It was
agreed that the Statement should be submitted to as many anthropologists and geneticists
as possible; therefore, an additional 69 renowned scientists contributed to its final form.
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(2) The Assumption that Race Crossing Results in Biologically In-
ferior Offspring
Ultimately, statutes prohibiting interracial marriage are a reflection
of the popular but erroneous stereotype that such marriages give rise
to biologically inferior offspring. The fact that the stereotype persists
even when the weight of scientific evidence is against it testifies to its
ideological rather than scientific character. Although there is no lack
of research and literature assessing the biological consequences of race-
crossing, "hardly any well-substantiated examples of disharmonious con-
stitution resulting from miscegenation have been reported."" Independ-
ent evaluations of this literature tend to conclude that prohibitions
against interracial marriage are primarily social and psychological and
not biological.72
(3) The Assumption that Cultural Level is Dependent Upon Racial
Attributes
Statutes prohibiting interracial marriage commonly perpetuate an-
other assumption that is totally inconsistent with valid knowledge per-
taining to the relationship between race, progress and cultural achieve-
ment.' 3 There is no evidence to sustain the contention that cultural level
is dependent upon racial or biological attributes.
Race, in its scientific dimension, refers only to the bio-genetic and
physical attributes manifest by a specified population. It does not,
under any circumstances, refer to culture (learned behavior), language,
nationality, or religion. One of the fundamental axioms of both physical
and cultural anthropology is that culture (behavior) is independent of
race. Civilizations and cultural achievement are not based on genes or
physical characteristics. There are no known racial or biological bar-
riers to the acquisition or creation of any cultural tradition,74 a fact
71 Stem, Principles of Human Genetics 570 (1949). See especially Chapter 26, "Genetic
Aspects of Race Mixture," pp. 563-79.
72 Boyd, Genetics and the Races of Man 364-65 (1950); Castle, Biological and Social
Consequences of Race -Crossing, 9 American Journal of Physical Anthropology 145-56
(1926); Cook, Racial Fusion Among California and Nevada Indians, 15 Human Biology
153 (1943); Hankins, The Racial Basis of Civilization 328-51 (1926); Kroeber, Anthro-
pology 198-201 (1948); Ashley Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of
Race 100-33 (1945).
73 Naim v. Naim, supra note 20: "Both sacred and secular history teach that nations
and races have better advanced in human progress when they cultivated their own dis-
tinctive characteristics and culture and developed their own particular genius." 197 Va.
at 90, 87 S.E.2d at 756.
74 The literature and research denying a direct association between racial membership
and cultural achievement is voluminous. However, the following references are among
those giving a cogent presentation of the position of contemporary biological and social
science: Beals and Hoijer, An Introduction to Anthropology 195-98 (1953); Hankins,
The Racial Basis of Civilization 367-71 (1926); Kroeber, Anthropology 190-92 (1948);
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amply demonstrated by the creation and dissemination of cultural in-
novations in the United States irrespective of the racial composition of
that population.
The scientific material available at present does not justify the con-
clusion that inherited genetic or racial differences are a factor in pro-
ducing the differences between cultures. Cultural and civilizational fac-
tors are transmitted by learning and education, not by the genes.7
When the Selective Service System published its rate of rejections for
mental deficiency, it showed that while Negro illiteracy exceeded white
illiteracy in the South, white illiteracy in the Southeast exceeded Negro
illiteracy in the Northwest and the far West.78 Economic-socio-political
factors and not race determine education and health. There are no racial
monopolies on cultural achievement. Historical and comparative studies
of human culture show that vast changes have taken place in the eco-
nomic, political and social institutions of a given society without any,
or with little, change in the racial or genetic composition of the popu-
lation concerned.
If the weight of the scientific evidence formerly prevalent justified
the fear of biologically inferior offspring through intermarriage, then a
sound legislative objective was being sought. However, now that these
theories have been proven false, the legislative object is also fallacious.
Legislative determination cannot reverse empirical fact. Constitutional
construction cannot remain unchanged when originally predicated upon
a false premise.7
The statutes are self-contradictory, containing within themselves
certain permissible areas of miscegenistic marriage. Apparently, "scien-
tific" thought varies from State to State. As has been shown, some legis-
latures see no danger in white-Mongolian marriages, while others do.
None, with the exception of North Carolina, perceive any evidence of
deterioration in the offspring of intermarriage among any of the races
other than white.78  Even as to Negroes, the degree of Negro genes
thought sufficient to cause contamination varies from State to State, and
Ashley Montagu, An Introduction to Physical Anthropology 352-81 (1951); Ashley
Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race 146-55 (1945).
75 UNESCO Statement on the Nature of Race and Differences, supra note 70, at article 6.
76 Ginzburg and Bray, The Uneducated 43 (1953).
77 The Court in Brown v. Board of Education recognized that a changing society might
require a different constitutional construction when it said: "Public education is today
a wholly different thing from what it was when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted."
347 U.S. at 493.
78 In that State, intermarriage between a Cherokee Indian of Robeson County and a
Negro or person of Negro descent to the third generation is prohibited. There is no
similar restriction against Cherokees of counties other than Robeson nor against Indians
other than Cherokees regardless of their county. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-3 (1950).
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in the most absurd instance, Colorado permits in one part of the State
interracial marriages which are prohibited in another part of the State.79
It is not scientifically possible to determine whether a person is "one-
eighth Negro," "one-half Malay," or is one of the many varieties of
fractionated racial memberships. Such terms as "half-breeds," "octa-
roons," "full-bloods," and the like, are misleading when used in anything
but the fictional or social sense; for example, the popular expression that
a person is "one-quarter Chinese" has no necessary biological or genetic
meaning-it does mean, pragmatically, only that one of a set of grand-
parents of that person was socially defined as a person of Chinese
ancestry. It carries no genetically meaningful import, for example, that
one-quarter of the genes of that person are "Chinese." Genes are not
known to be transmitted in any such predetermined or culturally labeled
quantities-an observation that has prompted one scholar to remark:
Laws prohibiting marriage between "whites and persons having one-
eighth or more of Negro blood" are compounded of legal fiction and
genetic nonsense.80
In actual fact, the miscegenist prohibition is based not upon ratio-
cination at all but rather upon deep-seated racial attitudes.8' As was
said by one court:
... the social relation and practices of the races have, in the interest of
our civilization as well as in expression of the natural pride of the dominant
Anglo-Saxon race and of its preservation from the degeneration social
equality, between the races, would inevitably bring, imperatively neces-
sitated and created immutable rules of social conduct and social re-
straint, that the just ends indicated might be attained and permanently
maintained.... Among these are: The inhibition against the authorization
or legalization of marriage between any white person and a negro .... 82
CONCLUSION
When subjected to the test of the Fourteenth Amendment, such emo-
tionalism must yield to rational thinking. Marriage is a civil right and
as such subject to constitutional protection. Not only do the anti-mis-
79 Colo. Rev. Stat., supra note 1:
All marriages entered into between Negroes or mulattoes of either sex, and white
persons are declared to be absolutely void. Nothing in this section shall be so con-
strued as to prevent the people living in that portion of the state acquired from
Mexico from marrying according to the customs of that country.
It would appear that the marital customs of Mexico would be a matter of judicial notice.
Yet in one case it was held that since the customs of that country were not in the
record, the court could not rule on whether the statute was complied with. Jackson v.
Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P.2d 240 (1942).
80 Hager, "Some Observations on the Relationship Between Genetics and Social Science,"
13 Psychiatry 371, 375 (1950).
81 Myrdal, op. cit. supra note 25.
82 Story v. State, 178 Ala. 98g, 103, 59 So. 480, 482 (1912).
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cegenation statutes have no scientific basis, but their philosophy is an
affront to millions of our citizens.
Repugnant as is the rationale of "social practices,"8 3 at least that
statement has the virtue of honesty as distinguished from the biologic
nonsense of "mongrel breed"8O and "weak and effeminate offspring."8 5
But the right of equal protection may not be denied even though a sub-
stantial segment of the population finds it distasteful. The Court re-
quired desegregation of the schools8" and transportation 7 despite the
violence of the opposition.
Classification by race based upon non-existent racial traits does not
serve any valid legislative purpose but merely continues a classification
of Americans as superior and inferior in contradiction to the American
concept of equality.
88 Ibid.
84 Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 90, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (1955).
85 Scott v. Georgia, 39 Ga. 321, 324 (1869).
86 Brown v. Board of Education, 47 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
87 Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 ( 956), affirming 142 F. Supp. 707 (D. C. Ala. 1956).
707 (D.C. Ala. 1956).
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